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In the spotlight
A blessing and a curse for immigrant women in the
Netherlands
BAUKJE PRINS
University of Groningen, the Netherlands
SAWITRI SAHARSO
University of Twente, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT Within a short period of time, the Netherlands transformed itself
from a relatively tolerant country to a nation that called for cultural assimilation,
tough measures and neo-patriotism. The discursive genre of ‘new realism’ played a
crucial role in this retreat from multiculturalism, and that had a dual effect for immi-
grant women. Whereas formerly they were virtually ignored by both the integration
and the emancipation policy, since the triumph of new realism they are in the centre
of both policy lines and there is now more policy attention for their needs and
interests. Yet in the public debate the culture card is drawn frequently and immi-
grant women are portrayed as either victims or accomplices of their oppressive
cultures. Policy makers and practitioners in the field, however, succeeded in avoiding
cultural stereotyping by developing cultural-sensitive measures, while naming them
in culture-blind terms.
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INTRODUCTION
‘The integration of ethnic minorities into Dutch society has grown into . . .
the “social question” of the 21st century, comparable to the problems that
accompanied the transformation of the rural population into urban labour-
ers at the beginning of the 20th century.’ So read one of the first sentences
of the document with which in 2004 the Dutch cabinet reacted to the report
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of the commission that had examined the results of Dutch policies of
integration since its beginning in the 1980s (TK, 2003–04a: 2). The political
party that had requested this evaluation, the Socialist Party, had actually
asked the commission to investigate why the integration policy had failed,
though this was subsequently reformulated in a more neutral vein. When
the commission presented its findings, concluding that in some parts the
policy had succeeded and in others had failed to reach its objectives, this
met with great scepticism. The general Dutch opinion is that the integration
of immigrants has failed because of a policy that was based on wrong – that
is multicultural – assumptions (see Entzinger, 2006).
In this article, we will argue that in the public debate on integration in
the Netherlands the genre of new realism gained the upper hand and we
will lay out the argumentative structure of this new realist discourse. New
realism not only revolves around the importance of ‘culture’, it is also a
highly gendered discourse. We will first assess the impact of this shift in
public discourse on the policy lines of integration and emancipation, and
then discuss the effects of these general developments on policies regard-
ing immigrant women. We will not only focus on formal policy documents,
but on one specific issue, violence against women, to see how official policy
plans are implemented by practitioners in the field. In a remarkably short
period, issues concerning immigrant women in the Netherlands have shifted
from the margins to the centre of public concern, which is, we conclude, both
a curse and a blessing.1
THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON INTEGRATION
At least until well into the 1990s, the Dutch took pride in the way they had
traditionally been able to manage sources of social, economic and religious
conflict through policies of toleration and pacification – the consociational
system of (religious) ‘pillarization’ and the much praised (socioeconomic)
‘poldermodel’ being among the more sympathetic peculiarities of Dutch
political culture. Combined with ongoing attempts to fight racism and
discrimination, these were assumed to be the reasons why the Netherlands
had seen little to no racial riots, why the extreme-right had never gathered
a large following, and why it was assumed that immigrants were doing
relatively well (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000).
However, long before ‘September 11’, issues of integration and immi-
gration had become the subject of ever more heated public debates. In
September 1991, the then leader of the Conservative Liberals (VVD)
initiated what was called the ‘national minorities debate’ (Bolkestein,
1991). European civilization, Bolkestein argued, is sustained by the values
of rationality, humanism and Christianity, bringing with them a number of
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fundamental political principles, such as secularization, freedom of speech,
tolerance and the principle of non-discrimination. Value pluralism was to
be embraced, but cultural relativism should be rejected. Bolkestein’s inter-
vention marked the beginning of what we will call a ‘new-realist’ approach
to immigration in the Netherlands. Almost a decade later, new realism
received further support by an essay written by the Social Democrat Paul
Scheffer (Scheffer, 2000). Scheffer castigated the Dutch elite for closing
their eyes to ‘The Multicultural Drama’ developing right before their eyes.
Although rates of unemployment, criminality and school drop-out among
children of immigrants were extremely high, the Dutch mistakenly held on
to their good old strategies of peaceful coexistence through deliberation
and compromise. However, Islam, with its refusal to accept the separation
of church and state, could not be compared to modernized Christianity, and
‘allochthone’ youngsters were accumulating feelings of frustration and
resentment. Teaching Dutch language, culture and history should be taken
much more seriously.
In autumn 2001, in the atmosphere of crisis following September 11,
the former Marxist sociologist Pim Fortuyn entered the political scene.
Fortuyn’s explicit aversion to Islam, the policy of toleration, the ‘left-wing
church’ and the continual influx of immigrants and asylum seekers,
combined with his charismatic presence, soon gave him a large following.
In one of his notorious interviews, he claimed that Holland was a ‘full
country’ (i.e. already too densely populated), and Islam ‘a backward
culture’. In the weeks following his assassination by an animal rights
activist on 6 May 2002 many mourners indicated that Pim had ‘said what
we were not allowed to say’ – a view that referred to white Dutch
people’s fear of foreigners ‘invading’ the country and their anger at the
ruling elite for not taking their concerns seriously. The ideal of multi-
culturalism had fallen into discredit, while the new realist discourse gained
the upper hand.
The Dutch genre of new realism can be identified by five distinctive
features. First, new realism emphasizes the need to listen to the ordinary
people, i.e. the ‘autochthonous’ lower classes in urban neighbourhoods. The
ordinary people deserve to be represented because they know from daily
experience what is ‘really’ going on in society, and because they are not
blinded by ‘politically correct’ ideas. Moreover, one should take their
complaints seriously in order to keep their emotions under control and
channel them in the right direction.
Second, a new realist presents him- or herself as someone who dares face
the facts, who has the courage to break taboos and speak frankly about
truths that the dominant discourse has supposedly covered up.
Third, new realists argue that it is high time to break the power of the
progressive elite, which has dominated the public realm for too long with
its ‘politically correct’ sensibilities, its relativistic approach to the values of
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different cultures and its lax policies of toleration. New realists instead call
for an affirmation of the values of western civilization over and against
Islam, such as the separation of state and church, freedom of speech and
the equality of men and women.
A fourth feature of new realism is its insistence on the (re)affirmation of
national identity. It promotes a revival of Dutch patriotism and the reinven-
tion of a Dutch Leitkultur.
Finally, the Dutch discourse of new realism is highly gendered. From the
very beginning, when participants in the debate on multiculturalism wanted
to prove the relevance of the issue at hand, they referred to issues of gender
and sexuality, such as the headscarf, arranged or forced marriage, female
genital mutilation (FGM), honour killing, the cultus of virginity, domestic
violence and homophobia.
Gender seeped into the new realist discourse in more subtle ways too.
Thus, in cases where immigrants were called on to leave behind their
cultural and religious inheritance and submit to the laws and customs of
Dutch society, implicitly it was only male immigrants who were addressed.
The assumption was that Dutch laws and customs particularly conflict with
the privileges of immigrant (i.e. Muslim) men. Immigrant (i.e. Muslim)
women, on the other hand, were depicted as ‘victims’ of their own culture,
and as having a self-evident interest in their integration into Dutch society
(see also Prins, 2002, 2004).
One of the most outspoken representatives of new realism was the
Dutch-Somali politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Since January 2003, when she was
elected as a member of parliament for the VVD, Hirsi Ali regularly created
a stir by controversial statements against (any kind of) religion. She casti-
gated Islam for its authoritative stance and deemed it especially backward
when it came to the position of women. Thus, she suggested that Islam was
accountable for practices such as female genital cutting, forced marriage
and honour killing.
In the summer of 2004, together with filmmaker Theo van Gogh, Hirsi
Ali made a short film, Submission I, which denounced the (sexual) violence
against Muslim women, suggesting that this was legitimized by Islam.2 The
movie was considered extremely blasphemous by pious Muslims. A couple
of months later, Van Gogh was assassinated by a young Dutch-Moroccan
man, who appeared to be a member of a network of radical fundamental-
ist Muslims. Hirsi Ali went into hiding; the Dutch government responded
with a series of arrests and stricter measures to fight Muslim terrorism.
Opinion polls pointed to a further hardening of Dutch public opinion
towards Muslims, especially towards Moroccans. The murder of Van Gogh
put Hirsi Ali in the spotlight of the international media. After a dramatic
clash over her right to Dutch citizenship, in May 2006 Hirsi Ali left the
Netherlands to take up a position at the American Enterprise Institute, a
conservative Washington DC think-tank.3
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Hirsi Ali’s interventions in the Dutch public debate left Dutch feminists
(Muslim and non-Muslim) severely divided. Her fierce attacks on Islam
gave her a huge following among conservative and liberal white Dutch, but
simultaneously alienated her from many of the Muslim women for whom
she claimed to speak. Some feminists celebrated her as a brave woman who,
in the best tradition of feminist activism, dared to be controversial and
speak up against patriarchal traditions. Others criticized her for stirring up
the latent racism and xenophobia among the Dutch population, and for
wanting to ‘liberate’ Muslim women without taking account of their own
ideas on liberation. Whereas Hirsi Ali suggested that women’s emancipa-
tion could only be achieved through the adoption of secular liberal values,
hence a rejection of Islam, many Muslim women insisted on the viability of
their attempt to combine Islamic faith with their struggle for emancipation.
Without a doubt, the charismatic person of Hirsi Ali and her ‘un-Dutch’
tendency to raise controversy and seek confrontation was an important
reason why the position of immigrants, and especially Muslim women,
became the focus of debate in the Netherlands from 2003. The question is:
to what extent did this shift in the public discourse reflect itself in the Dutch
policy plans regarding the integration of immigrants?
THE INTEGRATION POLICY
In the integration policy we discern three phases. In the first phase
(1982–94),4 under a coalition of first Liberals and Christian Democrats and
later Christian and Social Democrats, the analysis was that the maintenance
of minority cultures would facilitate immigrants’ integration into Dutch
society. This was fully in line with the Dutch tradition of ‘pillarization’
(verzuiling), the segmentation of Dutch society along confessional lines.
This tradition was closely connected to the emancipation movements of
Dutch religious minorities, such as the Catholics and the Dutch Reformed
Church in the 19th century, who wrested themselves from their subordinate
position by developing their own institutions (see Lijphart, 1975). The
Minorities Policy (Minderhedennota, 1983) hence targeted not individual
immigrants, but specific immigrant groups, literally named ‘ethnic minority
groups’ and their emancipation was believed to be executed via their
organizations.
In the 1994 Dutch parliamentary elections, the Christian Democrats
(CDA) were defeated and remained outside the government for the first
time in almost a century. Traditionally, it was the Christian Democrats who
cherished pillarization. This explains why the incoming so-called ‘purple’
coalition of Labour, Conservative Liberals and Social Liberals was able to
shift the focus of its policies. The bulk of policy measures were aimed at
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improving the school achievements of immigrant children and at promot-
ing immigrants’ labour participation. The preservation of minority cultures
was no longer considered a public responsibility (see TK, 1993–94). The
Minorities’ Policy was renamed ‘Integration Policy’ and no longer targeted
groups, but individual immigrants. The title of the memorandum, ‘Kansen
krijgen, kansen pakken’ (Getting opportunities, taking opportunities) (TK,
1998–99), said it all: immigrants were to be encouraged to seize the oppor-
tunities given to them by Dutch society. Another important shift involved
a growing feeling that the lack of socioeconomic integration of immigrants
was also due to their insufficient familiarity with Dutch language and
society. As a consequence, since 1998, every newly arrived immigrant from
outside the European Union was obliged to attend a newly launched
programme of language and civic integration (inburgering) courses.
Although the introduction of integration courses indicates a nascent sense
of the importance of culture for societal integration, in this second phase
(1994–2002) policy measures remained focused on the promotion of socio-
economic integration, from which cultural integration was thought to
follow.
Since the Fortuyn-revolt of May 2002 until February 2007 (the third
phase) the Netherlands were ruled by conservative-neoliberal govern-
ments.5 Instead of a precondition for socioeconomic integration, culture
now came to be considered as a problem in its own right. Cultural differ-
ences were associated with Islamic terrorism and with the undermining of
social cohesion and national identity. The quote with which we opened this
article continued, referring to (inter)national terrorism, ‘these events have
raised doubts about the loyalty of parts of the minority population to the
central values of Dutch society’ (TK, 2003–04a: 2).6 Former integration
policies were criticized for putting too much emphasis on the acceptance of
differences. ‘There is nothing wrong with that, but [often] this was inter-
preted as if the presence of allochthone ethnic groups in society would
constitute a value in itself, an enrichment tout court. One then loses sight of
the fact that not everything different is therefore valuable’ (TK, 2003–04b:
8). The solution according to the government was ‘shared citizenship’,
meaning that every inhabitant keeps to the same basic (Dutch) norms.
These include ‘doing one’s best to be able to support oneself . . ., caring for
one’s environment, respecting the physical integrity of others, also in
marriage, acceptance of every person’s right to express his opinion, accep-
tance of the sexual preferences of others, the equality of women and men’
(TK, 2003–04b: 8–9). Second, the Dutch cabinets in this period maintained
that it was not the government but immigrants themselves who were
responsible for their successful integration (TK, 2003–04b: 9). Thus,
although integration exams were compulsory, individual immigrants carried
the responsibility for organizing and financing their preparation for the
exam.
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Concern about the lack of social cohesion led the Dutch cabinet to
launch the so-called ‘Breed Initiatief Maatschappelijke Binding’ (Broad
initiative social ties) (TK, 2004–05b), a series of debates with civil society.
The integration courses and the introduction of a Dutch canon and civic
education in schools in 2006 were supposed to ensure citizens’ loyalty to
central Dutch values (CFI, 2006)). Civic education should explicitly address
the equal treatment of men and women as one of these values, as it was
recognized that the above mentioned ‘parts of the minority population’
urgently needed to be educated on this point (TK, 2003–04c).
If we ask ourselves whether there is any correspondence between the
shifts in the public debate and policy plans, the answer is clearly ‘yes’. New
realism’s insistence on Dutch culture as Leitkultur and the reaffirmation of
Dutch national identity and values thus achieved a clear translation in
public policy.
In November 2006, new elections brought a progressive majority into
Parliament and a government consisting of Christian Democrats, Labour
Party and Christian Union was installed in February 2007. The new govern-
ment announced the replacement of the individualistic approach of neo-
liberalism with a more communitarian outlook emphasizing the importance
of family values, civic duties and social cohesion. At the moment of writing
(June 2007), it is too early to say much about the course this new cabinet
will take regarding the emancipation and integration of immigrant women.
But a remarkable feature of its first Policy Programme (Samen Werken,
Samen Leven 2007 (Working together, living together 2007)) is that the
notions of ‘autochthone’, ‘allochthonous’ or ‘ethnic minority’ are rarely
used, while there is not a single reference made to Islam. Instead, when
addressing immigrant issues, the programme uses ethnically neutral terms
such as persons, citizens or inburgeraars (literally: someone who is
becoming a citizen).
THE EMANCIPATION POLICY
In the mid 1970s, pressurized by the women’s movement, the Dutch govern-
ment started developing official policies to foster the emancipation of
women. In this first period (between 1977 and 1981), the main goal was to
change the mentality of men and women alike (Keuzenkamp, 1995). This
was expected to lead to the transformation of existing gender roles. Govern-
ment, moreover, committed itself to the promotion of ‘characteristics and
activities traditionally associated with being a woman’ (quoted in TK,
2003–04e: 434).
During the second stage of the emancipation policy (1982–94), the policy
documents strike a more militant tone. Emancipation also involved the
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redistribution of power between the sexes. A more equal distribution of
paid and unpaid labour was needed, more women should be appointed in
decision-making positions and women should be actively encouraged to
become economically independent.7 Society would be transformed into a
truly pluriform society, in which there was room for each individual, men
and women alike, to live according to one’s desires. These transformative
intentions were again expressed in 1992, when a new policy programme
identified three spearheads: more participation of women in political
and social decision making, a redistribution of unpaid (i.e. care) labour
and a break with traditional ideas about femininity and masculinity
(Keuzenkamp, 1995: 9).
When in 1994 the first ‘purple’ cabinet came into office, on paper, govern-
ment remained committed to the ideal of a pluriform society. But at the
same time, during this third period of the emancipation policy (1994–2003),
economic concerns were put to the forefront more clearly. Thus in the policy
plan issued in 1996, the focus was on women’s participation in the labour
market, and on economic independence and the accessibility of higher
positions in governance and industry. It was a period of moderate optimism.
The title of the emancipation memorandum of 2000 was telling in this
respect: Van Vrouwenstrijd naar Vanzelfsprekendheid (From women’s
struggle to self-evidence) (Ministerie van SZW, 2000). In line with this
optimism, and to celebrate 25 years of emancipation policy, the Minister
then responsible for emancipation, De Geus, declared that for most people
it had become entirely obvious that women were present in almost all
domains of society. There was little need for extra policy efforts, as women’s
emancipation in the Netherlands was deemed to be right on track (Geus,
2003).
De Geus’s self-confidence met with indignation from many feminists,
and their scepticism was rapidly confirmed by the results of the Emanci-
patiemonitor (Emancipation monitor) published in 2006 (Portegijs et al.,
2006). The monitor showed that between 2002 and 2005, the process of
emancipation in the Netherlands had stagnated. The portion of working
women and the amount of hours that women worked per week had barely
increased. Likewise, there had been no significant growth of the portion of
economically independent women. The move of women into higher posi-
tions also fell short of expectations. The authors of the Emancipatiemoni-
tor 2006 expressed concern that the initial policy targets would not be
achieved.
During this fourth period (2003 to the present) there is a resurgent sense
of urgency about the emancipation of Dutch women. Hence the less opti-
mistic tone of the new long-term policy plan published in 2005. Its subtitle
can even be read as a direct comment on its predecessor: ‘Emancipatie:
Vanzelfsprekend, maar het gaat niet vanzelf!’ (Emancipation: Self-evident,
but it does not take care of itself!) (TK, 2005–06b). The general policy
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programme of the now ruling Balkende IV government likewise acknowl-
edges that women’s emancipation has not been completed. The new
government seems predisposed to adopt the main goals of the long-term
emancipation policy plan of 2005, i.e. (1) prevention and combat of violence
against women and girls (such as domestic violence, traffic in women and
female genital mutilation); (2) furthering the economic independence of
women; (3) prevention of the social exclusion of vulnerable and deprived
women; (4) and a more proportional representation of women in positions
of power and decision-making (see TK, 2005–06b).
Reconstructing the overall picture of some 30 years of active Dutch
government interference in women’s emancipation, two developments are
striking. First, we see that the initial aim of the general transformation of
Dutch culture into a truly pluriform society in which so-called ‘masculine’
and ‘feminine’ virtues would be equally appreciated, was supplanted quite
swiftly by more narrow economic goals. But over the years it appeared not
so easy to achieve this socioeconomic gender equality. Currently, the
average Dutch family has a full-time working husband while the wife
combines a small part-time job with the care for the children and house-
hold (Portegijs et al., 2006).
How come, despite the insistence of new realists that gender equality is
one of the main values of Dutch society, this very same society seems to
resist the pressures of both government and the market economy when it
comes to increasing the socioeconomic participation of women? To begin
with, Dutch political and policy culture have for a long time been domi-
nated by the Christian parties, which have always put an emphasis on family
values and supported the idea that the first task of a mother is to be avail-
able for her children. Second, because of the reasonable level of salaries,
good labour conditions and welfare state provisions, in many families there
is no economic necessity for both partners to have a full-time job. Third,
Dutch culture in general is known to be not very competitive, and recent
surveys show that many, including young Dutch men and women, are
inclined to prefer lifestyles that are not merely focused on individual
success, career and money (see for instance Hofstede, 2004: 108–26). Finally,
the heritage of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, with its critique of the
‘bourgeois’ family and its emphasis on individual autonomy, has been and
still is interpreted by many Dutch women in broader terms than just
exchanging the conventional role of the stay-at-home mother for the role
of the ambitious career-woman (Brinkgreve and Te Velde, 2006; Duindam
and Spruijt, 2007; Pessers, 1994).
A second remarkable development within the Dutch policies of emanci-
pation is that, since about 2003, the official policy documents contain a
more or less explicit subtext in which a distinction is made between policies
aimed at native Dutch women on the one hand, and policies aimed at non-
western immigrant women on the other. The aforementioned long-term
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emancipation plan 2006–10, which is expected to be adopted by the new
Balkenende IV government, illustrates this bifurcation along ethnic lines
quite well. Whereas the second and fourth aim, i.e. furthering the economic
independence of women and a more proportional representation of women
in the top echelons of Dutch society, are geared to native women in the first
place, the other two aims, i.e. combating violence against women (FGM,
honour killing) and preventing the social exclusion of ‘vulnerable and
deprived women’ (e.g. women from ethnic minority groups) are geared to
non-western immigrants.
The most significant change compared to previous policy plans on eman-
cipation is the addition of this latter goal, the prevention of social exclusion.
In the explanatory notes, it is acknowledged that for some groups it is not
realistic to expect them to acquire paid labour. Hence, while ‘autochtho-
nous’ women are encouraged to acquire paid work and go ‘for the top’, for
immigrant women the set aim is that they will at least do unpaid, volunteer
work. As the labour participation of Surinamese and Antillean women
is above average, this can only refer to especially Turkish, Moroccan,
Somalian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Bosnian women – most of whom are Muslim.
Thus, the recent Dutch documents on emancipation make a tacit distinc-
tion between immigrant and non-immigrant, or better: between non-
Muslim and Muslim women, where the first are captured under the generic
heading of ‘women’ who are to be encouraged to become economically
independent and break through the glass ceiling, while the latter fall under
the heading of ‘vulnerable and deprived women’ for whom paid work or
positions of power are mostly out of reach, and who instead are simply
encouraged to participate in society by volunteering in care activities
(mantelzorg) and other kinds of social work.
POLICIES REGARDING IMMIGRANT WOMEN: EMANCIPATE
IN ORDER TO INTEGRATE?
The question poses itself: which developments have led to this bifurcation
along ethnic lines? If we look at the history of the Dutch approach of
immigrant women, we see that it runs parallel to the history of emancipa-
tion policies in general, but that it takes a separate course from the very
beginning.
In January 1977, a report by the Werkgroep Buitenlandse Vrouwen
(Foreign Women Study Group) was published. The report found that
‘foreign women’ (see TK, 2003–04a: 434) lagged behind ‘autochthonous’
women in many respects.8 Although the 1977 white paper on emancipation
mentioned the need to develop special policies geared to immigrant women
because of their cultural differences, the pillarization motto of integration
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with the maintenance of cultural identity made it difficult to develop
such policies. As a consequence, during this first period (1977–81), a
governmental policy on immigrant women was virtually non-existent.
In 1982 the Emancipation Council called for specific policies for women
within the Minority Policy that was just being developed. The 1985 Eman-
cipation Nota also dedicated attention to the specific situation of immigrant
women. Their problems were perceived as caused by a lack of education
and of relevant work experience, and by different cultural norms and values.
The suggested aims of emancipation policies geared to immigrant women
were threefold: (1) to further equal rights, on condition that their own
cultural values were respected; (2) to improve their position in the domains
of education and work and to increase the accessibility of social welfare
institutions; and (3) to challenge traditional representations of gender
relationships (TK, 2003–04a: 439). Although again this set of goals saddled
policy makers with a paradoxical task, during this second phase (1982–94),
a number of emancipatory projects, the so-called VEM (women and minori-
ties) projects, were initiated by the ministries responsible for minority and
emancipation policies. These small-scale projects were geared to improving
the level of education and the labour market participation of immigrant
women while, in line with the tradition of pillarization, they also supported
self-organizations, and developed aid projects focused at women from
specific ethnic groups.
When the VEM projects were finished, a third phase started, covering
the period between 1994 and 2003, during which problems of immigrant
women were alternately addressed as part of the agendas of immigrant
integration and women’s emancipation. Thus, while between 1997 and 1999
reports on ethnic minorities contained separate chapters addressing the
position of ‘black, migrant and refugee women’, between 2001 and 2003,
emancipation programmes contained separate sections on immigrant
women. There is no need to say that such fragmentation did not lead to very
effective policy measures.
All in all, in the first decades of Dutch integration and emancipation
policies, immigrant women occupied a marginal position. While integration
policies focused mainly on the male migrant, emancipation policies took the
situation of ‘autochthonous’ women as their starting point (Roggeband and
Verloo, 2007). This changed from 2003 onwards. Right after the start of the
second Balkenende government and the installation of Ayaan Hirsi Ali as
a member of parliament, the Ministries of Justice (taking over the integra-
tion of ethnic minorities from the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Social
Affairs joined forces by setting up the so-called Participatie van Vrouwen
uit Etnische Minderheidsgroepen (PaVEM) commission. With the installa-
tion of this high-profile commission, a fourth period seems to have started
during which immigrant women moved from the margins to the very centre
of both emancipation and integration policies (2003–07). In 2005, the
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commission published its plans, according to which before 2010, immigrant
women should have made up their arrears in Dutch language, paid work
and social participation. These plans are currently implemented under
supervision of a direction group ‘labour participation ethnic minorities’
(TK, 2005–06b: 29) and have also been included in the so-called Deltaplan
inburgering (Deltaplan integration) of the Balkenende IV government.
It is worth noting that, contrary to the aims set by general policies of
emancipation, immigrant women are not assumed to catch up with men, but
with native Dutch women – who, however, as we have indicated, in many
respects still lag behind women in other western countries. The PaVEM
plans for immigrant women were inspired by the motto (presumably an
African saying): ‘If you educate a women, you educate a family’ (see
PaVEM, 2005). Within the context of the international development
organizations from which it is adopted, this saying captures the idea that the
empowerment of women is essential to the transformation of the traditional
patriarchal societies they live in. Likewise, in the Netherlands, immigrant
women’s education and participation are not just meant to stimulate their
personal development, it is also expected that as wives and mothers they
will pass on Dutch values and norms to their husbands and children, and
thus have a ‘civilizing’ influence on their own community.
Next to stimulating the social participation of immigrant women, the
2005 long-term emancipation document also aimed to prevent and combat
violence against women and girls. Although phrased in a general way, the
examples of the kinds of violence to be combated (honour-related violence,
female genital cutting – or ‘female genital mutilation’ as it is named in the
document – and traffic in women) indicate that, similar to the policies
geared to social participation, the actual focus was on immigrant women.
Hence, immigrant women were simultaneously seen as important cultural
brokers upon whom the integration of their community is dependent, as
well as victims of their patriarchal cultures who are in need of support in
order to free themselves from oppressive practices (see also Roggeband
and Verloo, 2007).
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
In 2002, the policy document ‘Privé geweld – publieke zaak’ (Private
violence – public cause) (TK, 2001–02) appeared, in which a coordinated
approach to this issue was formulated. Family violence now has a structural
place in the national security programme and the Big Cities policy. The
measures include the formation of a network of support and advice centres
on family violence in 35 local councils (TK, 2001–02: 17–18). Citizenship
education, already mentioned in the paragraph on integration, also returns
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as emancipation activity in as far as its subjects include arranged marriage,
gang rapes and so-called ‘loverboys’ (men who lure girls into prostitution
by first posing as their generous lover). On FGM, a policy plan was
developed in 20059 and a broad programme of measures ranging from
prevention to prosecution is now being implemented. Honour related
violence has also been designated in 2005 by the Lower Chamber as a so-
called ‘large project’ (TK, 2005–06a). Measures concerning honour-related
violence are aimed at securing more safety for the victims, prevention and
raising professionalism among the police and staff members of women’s
shelters. The Dutch cabinet is bound to report periodically to the Chamber
about progress made in combating honour-related violence, genital mutila-
tion and family violence, which are seen as related to each other (TK,
2005–06a: 18–20).
The issue of FGM has been put on the Dutch political agenda by Ayaan
Hirsi Ali. It is estimated that in the Netherlands yearly around 50 girls are
being ‘circumcised’ (Keuzenkamp et al., 2006: 256). The Dutch approach
consists of a combined strategy of legal prosecution and information,
education and communication (IEC). In the Netherlands, FGM counts as a
penal offence. So far, however, there has not been a single case in which
perpetrators of FGM have been brought to court, basically because of lack
of evidence. To make prosecution more effective, the law has therefore been
changed so that FGM now counts as an offence before the Dutch law, even
if it has been performed in a country where it is not an offence. Another
measure proposed by Hirsi Ali in order to make prosecution more effec-
tive was a compulsory yearly medical check of all girls from high-risk groups
(i.e. girls from Somalia, Sudan and Egypt). This suggestion was rejected by
the Dutch cabinet, as it was considered to be discriminating, and because
an extensive genital examination without medical necessity and without the
consent of the person involved, would infringe on her right to physical
integrity. Pharos, the Dutch refugee and health knowledge centre, desig-
nated by the government as the focal point for girls ‘circumcision’ (Pharos’s
terminology, BP/SS), has been given the task of developing the IEC
approach. It does so in close collaboration with the communities concerned
(Pharos, 2006–09).
Until recently, honour-related violence was not well recorded in the
Netherlands. According to a recent pilot study, in a period of six months in
one police region, 79 cases were reported, of which 11 had a fatal ending
(Keuzenkamp et al., 2006: 254). The analysis of the policy document on
honour-related violence (TK, 2005–06a) is that family violence and honour-
related violence do not need a separate approach. At the same time, the
document recognizes that ‘because of the nature of the phenomenon,
honour related violence demands specific knowledge on intervention
methods for an effective approach’ (TK, 2005–06a: 2). Clarifying the nature
of this ‘specific knowledge’, the document refers to family and migration
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patterns and relevant social and economic factors. It thus bespeaks an
awareness that ‘culture’ is not the all explaining factor (TK, 2005–06a: 5).
The policy document also stresses that sustained contacts between the
communities and institutions are indispensable. Reference is made to more
than 50 meetings, organized by minority organizations and financed by the
Ministry, in order to initiate activities to be undertaken from within the
communities.
To add some flesh and blood to the gist of these official documents, on 8
May 2006 we had an interview with Sezai Aydogan, senior staff member of
Transact (now Movisie), the national expertise centre for combating family
violence and sexual violence. Mr Aydogan confirmed that the sensitizing
activities are being conducted in collaboration with a wide range of self-
organizations of immigrant groups.
Critics often warned that Hirsi Ali’s fierce attacks on Islam would disable
Muslim and immigrant organizations from recognizing family violence as a
problem in their communities. It seems, however, that their effect was
precisely the opposite: they created the opportunity and the financial means
(as government was prepared to invest in the issue) for these organizations
to act against it. Likewise, while the dominant public discourse insisted on
legal prosecution, we were surprised to learn that practitioners in the field
have opted for the soft approach of information and persuasion. And while
the official policy line is to target the individual immigrant, practitioners
chose close collaboration with immigrant organizations. The entire
approach, as well as its explanation and justification, are very much phrased
in terms of the practices that are to be combated; the cultural background
of some of these practices is only alluded to between the lines, as it were.
In a so-called masculinity project, for instance, the working groups often are
all Turkish or all Moroccan, but the participants are asked to reflect on what
masculinity means for them as a person, not on masculinity in Turkish or
Moroccan culture. When asked, Mr Aydogan confirmed that in the field,
family violence is indeed conceptualized as a general problem of the
violence of men against women. This perception of the issue stands in stark
contrast to the public debate in which violence against women is cultural-
ized and Islam in particular is portrayed as oppressive to women.
Policies that address family violence in immigrant families inevitably
have to address the tension between gender equality and respecting cultural
diversity. The practitioners engaged with family violence seem to have
found a way to negotiate this tension by developing culturally sensitive
measures, but naming them in culture blind terms.10 While some may under-
stand this negatively as proof of a multiculturalist sitting on the fence in
the field of welfare, it may also be understood as a pragmatic way to deal
with differences, a strategy entirely in line with the Dutch tradition of the
pacification of conflicts through deliberation and compromise.
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BET WEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA
Within a very short period of time, the so-called Fortuyn-revolt of 2002
transformed the Netherlands from a relatively tolerant and relaxed country
to a nation that called for repression, tough measures and neo-patriotism.
Where before it was claimed that the Dutch cherished no nationalistic
sentiments, afterwards a majority of the population said ‘no’ to the
European Constitution, and supported the harsh implementation of asylum
rules, while intellectuals emphasized the need for the reinvention of a Dutch
canon, and also questioned the value of cultural diversity and the loyalty of
the Muslim population to Dutch society (see for instance Sniderman and
Hagendoorn, 2007).
How was the fate of immigrant women affected by this remarkable
reversal in the Dutch mood? If we recapitulate the developments in the
public and policy discourse over the last 30 years, the following picture
emerges. Between 1977 and 1982, both policies of integration and emanci-
pation were still under construction. (White) women’s emancipation, it was
thought, necessitated a change in mentality concerning traditional gender
roles, hence a radical transformation of Dutch culture, while the integration
of immigrants presumably necessitated the preservation of their own
cultural background. The combination of these views made any attempt to
develop an approach to immigrant women virtually impossible.
During the second phase (1982–94), the minority policies held on to the
pillarization motto of the maintenance of cultural group identities, while
within the policies of emancipation, the focus was gradually shifting from
cultural change to the need for women to catch up with men regarding
economic independence and social and political empowerment. This made
it difficult to develop unambiguous policy guidelines for immigrant women,
as the preservation of their own cultural identity was squarely at odds with
the policies of emancipation that would require them to assimilate to the
lifestyle norms of (native Dutch) men.
During the following period (1994–2002), while policies of emancipation
were straightforwardly aimed at further socioeconomic empowerment, and
there was an optimistic belief that (native Dutch) women were firmly on
track and needed little extra help, the policies of integration likewise were
more and more inclined to shift the responsibility of integration from
governmental institutions and self-organizations to individuals themselves.
Immigrant women thus again ended up between the devil and the deep blue
sea, in a no man’s land in-between the policy frameworks of women’s
emancipation and immigrants’ integration.
It was only during the fourth period, between 2003 and 2006, that immi-
grant (in particular, Muslim) women moved from the margin to the centre
of Dutch public debate and policy making.
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It is worth noting that at the beginning of this period, at the time of the
Fortuyn-revolt, although the new realist critics of immigration and Islam
frequently referred to issues of gender and sexuality, they did so only to
illustrate their cultural ‘backwardness’, hence the dangerous ‘otherness’ of
Muslim immigrants, not to express any real concern for the problems of
Muslim women.
It was the feminist political entrepreneurship of Ayaan Hirsi Ali that
managed to make a fruitful connection between the Dutch populist dis-
content about the (implicitly male) Islamic immigrant population and the
difficult position of Muslim women. In this respect, Hirsi Ali succeeded
where other feminist politicians (who for years had attempted to get
problems of immigrant women on the agenda) failed: the larger Dutch
audience has become more aware of the problematic situation of many
immigrant women and girls, and both Dutch policy makers and Islamic self-
organizations are now encouraging projects to break taboos and discuss
problems, such as the problem of sexual and family violence.
In our view, for immigrant (Muslim) women this development has
proven itself to be both a curse and a blessing. The curse is that, since the
triumph of new realism, in the public discourse especially Muslim women
figure as either the victims of their own culture and religion or, in the case
of women who actively identify themselves as Muslim (for instance by
wearing a hijab), as accomplices to a culture which is oppressive to women
and a threat to the cohesion of Dutch society and to the values underlying
the Netherlands as a liberal-democratic state.
The blessing, however, albeit to many a blessing in disguise, is that by
putting Muslim women in the spotlight, they were challenged to take a
standpoint and speak up in public. Although many did so in order to lash
out against Hirsi Ali and to make it clear that she did not speak for them,
they were still not only enabled to defend (their interpretation of) Islam,
but also to express their own views of and desires for emancipation.
Another blessing in disguise is the considerable discrepancy between the
polarization and radicalization of positions in the public debate on the one
hand, with gender relations as the paradigmatic example of the gap between
Dutch majority and minority cultures, and the pragmatic policy measures
taken to stimulate the emancipation of immigrant women on the other.
Whereas in the debate the culture card is drawn frequently, policy makers
and practitioners in the field are careful not to link up certain problematics
(such as family violence) too quickly with a particular cultural or religious
background. As we indicated already, practitioners engaged with family
violence seem to have found a fruitful and effective way to negotiate the
tension between the value of gender equality and the value of respecting
cultural diversity, by developing culture-sensitive measures, but naming
them in culture-blind terms.
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Notes
1 In Dutch discourse, the terms most often used are ‘ethnic (or cultural) minori-
ties’, and ‘allochthone’ (allochtoon) versus ‘autochthonous’ (autochtoon). In
official documents, the term ‘allochthone’ refers to those residents who are
either themselves born outside the Netherlands, or of whom at least one of their
parents is born outside the Netherlands, while ‘autochthonous’ refers to native
citizens. The terms ‘cultural’ and ‘ethnic minority’ were introduced in the 1970s
to select target groups for policy measures, as it was observed that members of
certain immigrant groups, recognized by their ethnicity, occupied a position of
socioeconomic deprivation. In everyday usage, ‘allochthone’ as well as the term
‘ethnic minority’, are reserved for people of colour and/or of non-western
origin. In this article, we will speak of ‘immigrants’ and ‘immigrant women’ in
order to hold some distance from the Dutch terminology, which suggests that
people ‘from there’ can never become ‘from here’.
2 For both the original script of Submission, Part I, and the movie itself, see Hirsi
Ali (n.d.).
3 In her autobiography, Hirsi Ali gives an extensive report of the (melo)dramatic
conditions under which she saw herself forced to give up her seat in Dutch
parliament and leave the country (Hirsi Ali, 2007). For more information about
Hirsi Ali’s ideas, see Hirsi Ali, 2006.
4 Between 1981 and 1982, a progressive coalition of Christian Democrats, Social
Democrats and Social Liberals ruled, followed by two conservative–neoliberal
coalitions between 1982 and 1990, and a coalition of Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats between 1990 and 1994.
5 May 2002, after the parliamentary elections and only nine days after the murder
of Fortuyn, a cabinet was formed by the Christian Democrats, the Conservative
Liberals and the List Pim Fortuyn, headed by the Christian Democrat Jan Peter
Balkenende (Balkenende I). This government fell within nine months, after
which a new coalition was formed of Christian Democrats, Conservative Liberals
and Social Liberals (Balkenende II), which after its fall in June 2006 (because of
the controvery about Hirsi Ali’s Dutch nationality), continued to rule as an
outgoing cabinet until the next elections of November 2006 (Balkenende III).
6 Numerous other policy documents express this doubt about the loyalty of
immigrants to Dutch society, e.g. the policy document ‘Grondrechten in een
pluriforme samenleving’ (Basic rights in a pluriform society), TK, 2003–04d.
7 The militant tone of the emancipation documents in this period was set by the
first Minister of Emancipation Hedy D’Ancona, one of the leading feminists of
the Dutch women’s movement, who was in office between 1981 and 1982.
8 At the time, the labour market participation of immigrant women was actually
higher than that of native Dutch women, although there were significant differ-
ences between the different ethnic groups. In 1981, for instance, 32.9 percent of
the Dutch, 42.1 percent of the Turkish and 16.3 percent of Moroccan women
had a paid job (see TK, 2003–04d: 435).
9 FGM is the official policy term (see TK, 2004–05a).
10 This seems to be symptomatic for a larger trend among the practitioners
working with immigrant women. See also Saharso (2003) on surgical hymen
repair or Saharso (2005) on sex-selective abortion.
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